B — 2 only

Section 54 requires a special resolution. That is a voting requirement, different from a resolution requiring special notice under section 115. Statement 1 substitutes the wrong legal expression. Statement 2 reflects the prescribed particulars of the resolution: number of shares, current market price, consideration and classes of directors or employees receiving them.

For listed equity, section 54 refers to SEBI regulations; it does not prescribe the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act as the issue procedure. Statement 3 is therefore incorrect. Only statement 2 survives. Sweat equity rewards know-how, intellectual property or value additions; it is not simply another name for a cash bonus.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.54(1)(a), (b) and (d).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — Tribunal confirmation of the application

Section 66 permits reduction by a company limited by shares, or limited by guarantee and having share capital, through a special resolution and subject to confirmation by the Tribunal. The question asks for one mandatory condition among the offered alternatives: Tribunal confirmation is the correct one.

A Board resolution cannot replace the members’ special resolution. Nor can the Registrar replace the Tribunal as the confirming authority. The Registrar receives the certified order and approved minute for registration at the appropriate stage. Do not confuse the decision approving reduction, judicial confirmation and subsequent registration: each performs a different function.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.66.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Secured and unsecured debt may not exceed twice capital and free reserves

The ordinary rule in section 68(2)(d) is a maximum post-buy-back debt-to-capital-and-free-reserves ratio of 2:1. Thus the combined secured and unsecured debt should not exceed twice the relevant capital and free reserves. The Act allows a higher ratio to be notified for specified classes of companies, so the 2:1 statement is the general rule rather than an exceptionless universal rule.

The separate quantitative buy-back limit is generally 25% of aggregate paid-up capital and free reserves, with a further equity-capital rule for an equity buy-back. Both 30% and 40% distractors confuse that limit with the debt test.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.68(2)(c)-(d).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Members holding at least one-tenth of voting paid-up share capital

Section 100(2)(a) uses not less than one-tenth of the paid-up share capital carrying voting rights, assessed on the date the requisition is received. The Board is then obliged to proceed in accordance with the statutory timetable. It is not necessary to assemble holders of one-half or one-third of the capital.

For a company without share capital, the corresponding test is members possessing at least one-tenth of the total voting power of all members entitled to vote. Keep the capital-based and voting-power-based formulations separate; the stem here is aimed at the company-with-share-capital rule.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.100(2).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — All concerned must sign the minutes within 30 days (preferred; see review note)

C is the strongest answer: minutes are authenticated in the prescribed manner, ordinarily by the chairperson; the Act does not require every person concerned to sign them. Section 118 separately requires preparation, signing and keeping of minutes within its statutory framework. Rule 25 and the applicable Secretarial Standard govern authentication.

There is a second wording issue. Section 118(4) expressly calls for the names of directors present, and the Secretarial Standard also addresses leave of absence. Option B’s blanket statement about every absent director is not a faithful reproduction of that provision. Because the printed stem and options are imprecise, this item is explained but excluded from the automatic practice score.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.118; Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014, r.25; SS-1.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Dividend must be paid to both registered and unregistered shareholders

Section 123(5) directs payment to the registered shareholder, to that shareholder’s order, or to that shareholder’s banker. It does not create an unrestricted entitlement for unregistered shareholders. The fourth option is therefore incorrect.

The other options refer to recognised sources or steps, but conditions matter. A dividend out of accumulated profits transferred to free reserves is subject to the prescribed rules when current profits are inadequate or absent. Government-provided money is relevant only where a government guarantee supports that payment. For exam purposes, identify both the lawful source of a dividend and the person legally entitled to receive it.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.123.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — Unpaid or unclaimed preference-share redemption money after five years

The defect is the five-year period in option A. Section 125 identifies unclaimed amounts such as matured deposits, matured debentures and preference-share redemption money, subject to the applicable seven-year condition. Income earned from investments of the Fund is also an authorised credit to the IEPF.

Do not learn this as “preference-share money never enters the IEPF.” It does, when the statutory requirements are met. The question tests the time condition attached to that source. The other unclaimed-amount options should also be read with their statutory waiting period, even where the printed options abbreviate it.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.125(2).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — 3 only

Statement 3 reflects section 135(5). Statement 1 overstates the independent-director requirement: the ordinary statutory composition refers to at least one independent director, with specific exceptions and adaptations. It is not a universal requirement for two.

Statement 2 assigns the Board’s responsibility to the CSR Committee. The Committee formulates and recommends the CSR policy, recommends expenditure and monitors the policy. The Board approves the policy and ensures that activities included in it are undertaken. Also remember the statutory relaxation where the required CSR expenditure does not exceed the prescribed threshold: a separate committee need not always be constituted.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.135(1), (3), (4), (5) and (9).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — Providing actuarial services to the company

Section 143(1) gives the auditor inquiry duties covering the matters described in A, B and D. Section 144 separately prohibits specified non-audit services, including actuarial services, when supplied directly or indirectly to the audited company or its holding or subsidiary company.

The distinction protects independence: an auditor should not audit a position that the same auditor has created through a prohibited advisory service. Approval by the Board or Audit Committee does not convert a specifically prohibited service into a permitted one. For revision, pair section 143’s inquiry duties with section 144’s prohibited-service list.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, ss.143(1) and 144.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 and 3 only

Sections 153 and 158 support statements 1 and 3. Section 154 uses one month for allotment after receipt of the application, subject to the prescribed process; the printed two-month assertion is incorrect. Only 1 and 3 are therefore correct.

A DIN identifies the individual director across company filings. It is not a separate identification number that must be obtained afresh for each company. When revising a cluster of adjacent provisions, attach a function to each number: 153 application, 154 allotment, 155 no multiple DINs, 156 intimation by the director, 157 company’s intimation, and 158 disclosure in relevant filings.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, ss.153, 154 and 158.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — A majority representing two-thirds in value must approve the arrangement

Section 230(6) refers to a majority of persons representing three-fourths in value of the creditors, members or relevant class, voting in person, by proxy or by postal ballot, and requires Tribunal sanction. The two-thirds fraction in option C is the error.

Notice and disclosure requirements help affected persons make an informed decision. A takeover offer may be included in a compromise or arrangement, subject to the applicable rules and, for listed companies, the relevant securities framework. Remember that a favourable vote does not itself complete the statutory process: sanction and the required filings remain important.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.230(2), (3), (6), (11)-(12).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — With no Registrar or Official Liquidator objection, the Central Government registers the scheme and issues confirmation

Section 233 provides the fast-track mechanism. Under its statutory scheme, the Central Government registers and confirms the scheme where the relevant authorities raise no objection, subject to the prescribed process. The Act’s objection period is thirty days, not fifteen.

Options C and D reverse the direction of succession. Registration results in the transfer of the transferor’s undertaking to the transferee. Pending legal proceedings continue by or against the transferee, and the liability for payment to dissenting shareholders in the stated situation also attaches to the transferee. Keep “transferor gives” and “transferee receives and continues” as the organising idea.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.233(2), (3) and (9).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — The head must be at least a Secretary to the Government of India

Section 211 provides for an SFIO Director who is an officer not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Option B raises this to Secretary and is incorrect. The difference between these ranks is the core numerical-administrative trap.

SFIO has a multidisciplinary investigation structure. Section 212 sets out circumstances in which the Central Government may assign an investigation, including public interest, and requires submission of the investigation report. Distinguish the office’s establishment and staffing under section 211 from assignment and conduct of particular investigations under section 212.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, ss.211 and 212.
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — A-2, B-4, C-3, D-1

Kotla Venkataswamy concerns the limits of protection for outsiders where the execution of a company document conflicts with its articles; it is commonly studied with constructive notice and indoor management. Erlanger is the leading promoters’ fiduciary-duty case, including disclosure of a promoter’s interest.

TCS v Cyrus Investments concerns oppression and mismanagement and the scope of relief in that jurisdiction. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v LIC deals with a corporate act outside the objects and the doctrine of ultra vires. The resulting sequence is 2-4-3-1. Matching questions become easier when each case is tied to one central legal issue rather than memorised as an isolated name.

Legal reference: Companies Act doctrine; Kotla (1934), Erlanger (1878), TCS v Cyrus Investments (2021), Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar (1963).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — 1, 2 and 3

All three describe powers within section 242. The Tribunal can issue suitable orders to end the matters complained of; the listed remedies include purchase of shares and removal of a managing director, manager or director. The correct combination is therefore all three.

These are not free-standing powers available whenever a shareholder dislikes a decision. Section 242 contains jurisdictional conditions concerning oppressive or prejudicial conduct and the relationship between just-and-equitable winding up and unfair prejudice. A sound answer recognises the breadth of the available remedies while retaining those conditions. This is also why the NCLT’s oppression jurisdiction should not be confused with routine corporate management.

Legal reference: Companies Act, 2013, s.242(1)-(2).
Companies Act, 2013 — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — 1, 2 and 3

BNSS section 41 covers an offence committed in the presence of a Magistrate, whether Executive or Judicial, within that Magistrate’s local jurisdiction. The Magistrate may personally arrest, order a person to arrest and, subject to the law governing bail, commit the offender to custody. All three statements fit that provision.

The local-jurisdiction and presence requirements matter. The example does not confer an unrestricted police-like power on every Magistrate everywhere. It illustrates a specifically authorised response to an offence personally witnessed within jurisdiction. Custody is also not a substitute for applying the relevant bail rules.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.41.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — Arrest without warrant may be possible on legally sufficient grounds of belief

A is the best of the offered answers, but it must be read with BNSS section 35 in full. For the relevant cognizable-offence category, the officer must satisfy the statutory grounds of belief and the separate necessity conditions for arrest, and record the required reasons. Resemblance alone is not a licence to arrest mechanically.

Arrest does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, which belongs to adjudication of guilt. Nor does the law invariably require a warrant or completed electronic-evidence authentication before an otherwise lawful arrest. Where arrest is unnecessary, the statutory notice-of-appearance mechanism and other safeguards remain applicable.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.35; Arnesh Kumar arrest safeguards.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — 3 only

The statutory application is made by the accused, not by the prosecutor or complainant. Section 290 introduces the thirty-day period after framing of charge. Only statement 3 is correct.

Eligibility must still be checked under the plea-bargaining chapter. The mechanism does not apply to every offence merely because the accused is willing to admit guilt. The court must examine voluntariness and the statutory exclusions, and the subsequent mutually satisfactory disposition follows the prescribed process. Separate three questions in revision: who can initiate, which offences qualify, and what the court must do after receiving a valid application.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.289-290.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — A total exceeding the court’s single-offence power automatically requires a higher-court trial

Section 25 expressly provides that it is not necessary to send the offender for trial before a higher court merely because the aggregate consecutive punishment exceeds the punishment the court can impose for one offence. Option C reverses that rule.

The court must still operate within section 25’s limitations, including the twenty-year aggregate ceiling and the restriction tied to twice the punishment the court is competent to inflict for a single offence. The choice between concurrent and consecutive sentences also requires judicial consideration. Do not import the older CrPC aggregate of fourteen years into this BNSS question.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.25.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — Both 1 and 2

Both methods are recognised by BNSS section 65(3): service on a partner, or a registered letter addressed to that partner. The provision also sets out when postal service is deemed effected.

The question should not be confused with the separate rule for incorporated bodies. Companies and other corporations have their own authorised recipients under the preceding part of the section. In a procedural MCQ, first identify the legal character of the recipient—individual, company, firm or government servant—before choosing the method of service. That small classification often eliminates most distractors.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.65(3).
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — Execute the warrant directly under the urgency exception

The ordinary outside-jurisdiction procedure involves endorsement by the appropriate local authority. The BNSS also provides an urgency exception where delay in obtaining endorsement would prevent execution. In the stated imminent-departure situation, direct execution is the best offered response.

This is an exception to the usual process, not permission to ignore local procedure whenever convenient. After arrest, the provisions governing production before the appropriate authority and transit remain relevant. The examination cue is the bus about to depart: it supplies the factual urgency needed to apply the exception.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.81, especially the urgency proviso.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — A proclamation requiring appearance has been issued

Section 85 authorises the court issuing a proclamation under section 84 to attach property, with reasons recorded, at any time after issue of the proclamation. D is the best answer. Merely receiving information or merely issuing an arrest warrant does not replace this statutory foundation.

There is an important proviso: attachment may be ordered simultaneously with proclamation if the court is satisfied, by affidavit or otherwise, that the person is about to dispose of the property or remove it from the court’s local jurisdiction. Thus do not turn the answer into an absolute rule that attachment can never accompany proclamation.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.84-85.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — It may issue an arrest warrant

BNSS section 92 uses a discretionary formulation: the court may issue a warrant directing arrest and production before it. The question tests both the word “may” and the purpose of the warrant.

A compulsory-arrest answer substitutes “shall” for the legislative choice. The “locate” options also fail to capture the operative direction: arrest and production, rather than a mere tracing exercise. In procedural questions, underline the modal verb before considering the facts. May, shall, must and may not often carry more exam value than the surrounding narrative.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.92.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — Order interim attachment ex parte

Section 107 permits an interim ex parte attachment or seizure order where the court considers that giving notice would defeat the object. The imminent removal of the yacht is the factual reason for using that urgent protective power.

This does not dispense with the entire adjudicatory process or finally establish guilt. It preserves the asset pending the process contemplated by the section. The ordinary show-cause period stated in the section is fourteen days, so the ten-day distractor is also incorrect. Distinguish interim preservation from a final decision about ownership, criminal proceeds or forfeiture.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.107(2) and (5).
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Section 117 supplies the protective power that follows identification under section 116. An investigating officer who has the specified reason to believe that property may be concealed, transferred or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate proceedings may order its seizure. Prior judicial permission is not stated as an invariable precondition.

Where seizure is impracticable, the section provides a freezing-type order controlling transfer or dealing without permission. That is different from treating the owner’s delivery to a police station as the required statutory alternative. Statement 1 is therefore the correct choice.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.116-117.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — She may refuse that condition on the stated facts

BNSS section 144 recognises that a husband’s marriage to another woman or keeping a mistress is a just ground for the wife’s refusal to live with him. Her refusal is not automatically an unjustified refusal that defeats maintenance. Option C fits the stated facts.

The Magistrate must consider the legal grounds and the evidence rather than mechanically enforce the husband’s condition. At the same time, maintenance is governed by the section’s complete framework and is not decided solely by a moral label. The question tests the express explanation dealing with another marriage or a mistress.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.144(3), explanation.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — Require police first to obtain written statements from both parties as a prerequisite

Section 164 provides a preventive process for disputes concerning land or water likely to cause a breach of peace. The Magistrate issues the preliminary order, calls on the parties to attend and submit written statements, and inquires into actual possession. Fishery rights fall within the section’s extended subject matter.

The Magistrate does not decide the final legal title in this proceeding. “Without reference to claims” in the printed option should be understood as without determining the merits of the parties’ right to possession, not as refusing to read their statements. Requiring the police first to secure both statements as a mandatory gateway is the incorrect step.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.164.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — Enter the substance in the prescribed book

Falsification of accounts is classified as non-cognizable in the relevant Schedule entry. BNSS section 174 therefore requires entry of the substance of the information and reference of the informant to the Magistrate. Police investigation ordinarily requires the Magistrate’s order in such a case.

The offence’s potentially substantial maximum sentence does not, by itself, make it cognizable. Nor does an investigation order convert the officer’s powers into a general power to arrest without warrant in a non-cognizable case. Read the Schedule classification along with the procedural provision instead of guessing from how serious the facts sound.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, s.174 and First Schedule entry for BNS s.344.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — 1 and 3 only

The charge must identify the law and section. Where the usual particulars fail to give sufficient notice of the accusation, the manner of committing the offence must also be stated; obstruction is a statutory illustration of why that extra detail can be necessary. Statements 1 and 3 are correct.

The charge is written in the language of the court, not simply whichever language the accused personally understands. This does not remove the accused’s separate procedural protections concerning explanation, interpretation and a fair opportunity to understand the accusation. The distractor confuses the formal language of the charge with those fairness obligations.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.234 and 236.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — Frame a formal charge

In a summons case, BNSS section 274 requires the particulars of the offence to be stated and the accused to be asked whether he pleads guilty or has a defence. It expressly dispenses with a formal charge. Summary trial procedure ordinarily follows the summons-case model, subject to the chapter’s modifications.

Do not equate “no formal charge” with “no notice of the accusation.” The accused must still be told the substance of the allegation and given the statutory opportunity to respond. The contrast is between a formal written charge in the relevant trial category and the simpler statement of particulars required here.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.274 and 285.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — If the accused does not plead guilty, record the substance of evidence

BNSS section 287 requires the substance of evidence to be recorded where the accused does not plead guilty, together with a brief statement of reasons for the finding. A is correct. Summary trials follow the summons-case procedure, not the warrant-case procedure.

The sentence of imprisonment in a summary conviction is limited to three months under the general summary-trial provision. The special empowerment of a second-class Magistrate concerns the narrower statutory offence category, including the six-month punishment threshold, rather than the one-year assertion in C. Keep trial eligibility and the sentence that can actually be imposed as separate limits.

Legal reference: BNSS, 2023, ss.284-288.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — A Magistrate may authorise section 498A detention without recording reasons

The judgment rejects automatic arrest and mechanical remand. The police must examine the statutory necessity of arrest, and the Magistrate must independently scrutinise the material and record the required satisfaction before authorising detention. D contradicts that direction.

The directions were not confined to matrimonial offences: the Court extended their application to the stated category of offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. Although the judgment discussed the CrPC, the underlying discipline remains useful when reading the corresponding BNSS arrest provisions. Learn the arrest and remand safeguards as two independent checks, not as one police formality.

Legal reference: Arnesh Kumar v State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273; BNSS s.35.
BNSS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — Reviewing its own final orders on the merits

The former review provision in section 37 was omitted. The Commission’s power under section 38 to correct an apparent mistake is a rectification power, not a general power to rehear the merits of a concluded dispute. C is the correct answer.

The Act separately provides for overseas conduct having the required Indian competitive effect, interim orders and recovery of monetary penalties. A useful comparison is review versus rectification versus appeal: review reopens merits under an express power, rectification corrects a limited error, and an appeal is addressed to the appellate forum. The labels are not interchangeable.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, ss.32, 33, 37 (omitted), 38 and 39.
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

D — Predatory pricing

Predatory pricing is addressed as a form of abuse of dominance under section 4, subject to the statutory elements. The other options are categories addressed by section 3(4)’s vertical-agreement framework. D is therefore the correct classification.

A vertical agreement is not unlawful merely because it carries one of these labels: the applicable appreciable-adverse-effect-on-competition test must be considered. Similarly, a low price is not automatically predatory pricing; dominance, the prescribed cost analysis and the exclusionary purpose matter. The examination separates legal categories, while application requires the additional elements.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, ss.3(4) and 4(2)(a)(ii).
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

D — 1 and 3

D is the best statutory-classification answer. Statements 1 and 3 track section 4(2)(a) and (c). Statement 2 resembles the definition of a tie-in arrangement in section 3(4), without stating the additional elements of section 4(2)(d).

There is an important limit to the shortcut: a dominant enterprise’s tying conduct can also amount to abuse where the conditions of section 4 are satisfied, including unrelated supplementary contractual obligations. Therefore do not infer that tying can never be an abuse of dominance. This MCQ distinguishes the provisions’ formulations; a real case requires examination of dominance, contractual connection and competitive effects.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, ss.3(4)(a) and 4(2)(a), (c), (d).
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

C — Driving existing competitors out of the market

Driving existing competitors out of the market is expressly a section 19(3) factor. The other choices resemble factors relevant to evaluating dominance under section 19(4), not the specific agreement-effects list asked for here.

The AAEC analysis is not limited to harmful factors. The section also requires attention to specified benefits, including benefits to consumers and improvements in production, distribution or provision of services, subject to the applicable amended wording. Build separate revision lists for agreement effects, dominance, relevant geographic market and relevant product market. Mixing those four lists is the main trap in this part of the paper.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, s.19(3), contrasted with s.19(4).
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

A — Exclusion of in-house production

Regulatory barriers, distribution facilities and transport costs all help determine the geographic area within which competitive conditions are sufficiently homogeneous. Exclusion of in-house production belongs to the relevant-product-market factor list, not the geographic list. A is correct.

Think of geographic market as the practical area in which suppliers and customers can compete or substitute across locations. Transport cost and regulatory restrictions naturally affect that area. Product-market analysis asks a different question about products or services that constrain one another. This conceptual distinction is more reliable than memorising an undifferentiated list of section 19 factors.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, s.19(6)-(7).
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

C — The parties’ market shares individually and after a combination

Section 28 permits division of an enterprise enjoying a dominant position to prevent abuse. Its directions can address transfer of property and liabilities, securities and governing instruments. The market-share proposition in C is an evaluative factor associated with combinations, not a structural direction in that list.

The question contrasts a remedy with a factor used in analysis. Market shares may be important evidence elsewhere in competition assessment, but that does not turn the market-share figure itself into an operative division order. Ask whether an option tells the Commission what to consider or tells an enterprise what it must do.

Legal reference: Competition Act, 2002, s.28; compare s.20(4).
Competition Act and amendment texts — CCI · Original UPSC paper

C — Abuse of dominant position

The case concerned allegations of abuse of dominant position under section 4. It is therefore C, rather than a merger-control or cartel case. For this identification question, the central subject is sufficient.

When revising a judgment, separate its legal field from every commercial arrangement mentioned in the facts. A dispute may discuss supply agreements, rebates and related commercial conduct while the pleaded and adjudicated statutory issue remains abuse of dominance. Do not choose the agreements option merely because a contract appears in the narrative.

Legal reference: CCI v Schott Glass India Pvt Ltd, 2025 INSC 668, 13 May 2025; Competition Act s.4.
Schott Glass, 2025 INSC 668 — Supreme Court · Original UPSC paper

B — Identity theft

Section 66C expressly addresses fraudulent or dishonest use of another person’s electronic signature, password or other unique identification feature. The correct category is identity theft.

The nearby provisions test different conduct: section 66B concerns receiving stolen computer resources or communication devices; section 66D concerns cheating by personation using computer resources; section 66E concerns specified privacy violations; and section 66F concerns cyber terrorism. The same real-world incident can potentially involve more than one offence, but the precise fact singled out here is another person’s authentication credential.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, s.66C.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — Intermediary

The definition of intermediary in section 2(1)(w) includes a person who, on behalf of another, receives, stores or transmits an electronic record or provides a service concerning it. A is correct. The originator is the person who sends, generates, stores or transmits the record in the relevant sense, and the definition excludes an intermediary acting in that capacity.

The words “on behalf of another” are the decisive cue. Whether an intermediary qualifies for a particular protection or bears a particular duty is a separate question governed by the relevant provisions and rules; the definition alone does not settle liability.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, s.2(1)(w) and (za).
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — The subscriber holds the private key corresponding to the certified public key

Possession of the corresponding private key is part of a properly functioning public-key arrangement. It is not a defect that requires revocation. C is correct. By contrast, material misrepresentation, subscriber death in the circumstances covered by the provision and compromise of the authority’s key are recognised revocation situations.

Separate the subscriber’s private key from the Certifying Authority’s signing key. Compromise of either can raise security issues, but merely holding the subscriber key that matches the certified public key is normal. The Act also contains procedural protections and notification requirements surrounding suspension and revocation.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, ss.35-38.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — 1, 2 and 3

All three are supported by the amended IT Act framework. Section 48 designates the tribunal established under the TRAI Act, namely TDSAT. Section 58 provides that it is not bound by the CPC procedure and is guided by natural justice, while section 60 addresses application of limitation law as far as may be.

“Not bound by the CPC” does not mean free to act arbitrarily. Natural justice and the statute’s own procedural powers still govern. Also distinguish this tribunal from NCLAT, which is associated with company-law and competition appeals in their respective statutory frameworks.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, ss.48, 58 and 60.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — Traffic data

The section 70 explanation refers to a computer resource whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, economy, public health or safety. Traffic data is not one of those four impact areas.

This is a definition question, not a claim that traffic data is unimportant or that systems handling it can never be critical. A traffic-control or communications system may qualify on the actual security, economic, health or safety impact. The answer simply identifies the phrase that does not appear as a defining impact category.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, s.70, explanation.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Maintaining friendly relations with foreign States

Section 69B concerns cyber security and the identification, analysis and prevention of intrusion or the spread of computer contaminants. Friendly relations with foreign States is not one of that section’s stated purposes. D is correct.

That phrase appears in related but distinct legal contexts, including other information-control powers. Do not merge interception, public-access blocking and traffic-data monitoring into one power with identical grounds. The distinction matters because each power has its own trigger, authorising mechanism and safeguards. The question tests the grounds of section 69B specifically.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, s.69B; compare ss.69 and 69A.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — Provide the legally required facilities and technical assistance

A is the best general answer where the request is made under the applicable lawful authority and procedure. The IT Act and the applicable intermediary/cybercafé framework require cooperation and assistance in their specified circumstances; subscriber consent is not an invariable precondition to compliance with a lawful investigation demand.

This does not mean that any informal request from anyone claiming to be police permits unlimited disclosure. The authority, purpose, applicable provision and safeguards must still be checked. Section 69A concerns blocking public access; section 68 concerns the Controller’s directions. Neither is a universal substitute for identifying the correct information-production power.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, ss.67C and 69(3); applicable intermediary and cybercafé rules.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

Review: no definitive single option asserted

The positive statutory rule is clear: section 3(2) uses an asymmetric cryptosystem together with a hash function. Option B states that formulation. The explanation then describes a hash function as an algorithm mapping one bit sequence to another and calls the output a hash result.

The negative question is poorly differentiated: A describes the key-pair aspect, C mentions an output and D uses part of the statutory definition without specifying the required properties. These are not four cleanly independent technical alternatives. It would be misleading to manufacture certainty about a unique “cannot” answer. The item is retained for full coverage, with the correct statutory mechanism explained, and excluded from automatic scoring pending an authoritative key.

Legal reference: Information Technology Act, 2000, s.3(2), including its explanation.
Information Technology Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v Union of India (2022)

Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v Union of India, decided on 27 July 2022, is the major judgment examining the challenged PMLA framework, including section 5. B identifies the correct case among the alternatives.

Section 5 concerns provisional attachment, whereas section 19 concerns arrest and section 45 concerns bail conditions. Other judgments in the options address different procedural or factual disputes and are not the requested constitutional-validity decision. Read this as identification of the historical judgment asked in the paper, rather than as a claim that no aspect of PMLA law can ever be reconsidered or developed in later litigation.

Legal reference: Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v Union of India, 27 July 2022; PMLA s.5.
PMLA consolidated text — Directorate of Enforcement · Original UPSC paper

C — The Adjudicating Authority must first be informed before the officer may arrest

Section 19 does not make prior intimation to the Adjudicating Authority a condition of the arrest. The statutory forwarding of the arrest order and supporting material is a subsequent duty under the prescribed process. C is therefore incorrect.

The other safeguards remain significant: the authorised officer’s belief must be supported by material and recorded reasons; grounds must be communicated in accordance with the law, including the Supreme Court’s requirement concerning written grounds; and timely judicial production is required, subject to the journey-time exclusion. The question must not be read as permitting an arrest based on an unrecorded suspicion.

Legal reference: PMLA, 2002, s.19; Pankaj Bansal v Union of India (2023).
PMLA consolidated text — Directorate of Enforcement · Original UPSC paper

C — Both 1 and 2

Section 22 permits the relevant authority or court, in the situations specified there, to presume ownership of records or property found in a person’s possession or control and the truth of the records’ contents. It also addresses apparent handwriting, signatures and execution. Both statements match the presumption framework.

The crucial expression is “may presume.” This is not an irrebuttable declaration that every diary entry is true, nor does it by itself establish every ingredient of money-laundering. The statutory discovery context and the opportunity to rebut remain relevant. Avoid turning an evidentiary aid into an automatic conviction rule.

Legal reference: PMLA, 2002, s.22.
PMLA consolidated text — Directorate of Enforcement · Original UPSC paper

D — Neither 1 nor 2

Both statements confuse stages. The 180-day figure belongs to provisional attachment under section 5. Section 8(3) addresses confirmed attachment and provides the statutory continuation during investigation for up to 365 days, with the stated exclusion for periods of a court stay, or during the relevant court proceedings.

Finality does not arise merely because the calendar reaches day 365. Section 8 links final attachment to the specified confiscation order. Separate provisional attachment, confirmation, continuation and confiscation on a timeline. The same property may pass through those stages, but each stage has a different legal condition.

Legal reference: PMLA, 2002, ss.5 and 8(3).
PMLA consolidated text — Directorate of Enforcement · Original UPSC paper

C — The PMLA Director appoints the Administrator

Section 10 places the appointment power with the Central Government, through an order published in the Official Gazette. The appointed officer acts as Administrator for receipt and management of confiscated property under the prescribed conditions. C attributes that appointment to the Director and is incorrect.

A frequent special-statute trap is to assign every power to the investigating Director. Investigation, adjudication, judicial confiscation, vesting and property management are distinct functions distributed among different authorities. When revising PMLA, make an authority-action table rather than assuming that one office performs them all.

Legal reference: PMLA, 2002, s.10.
PMLA consolidated text — Directorate of Enforcement · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only (preferred; see review note)

A is the preferred exam answer. Section 7 covers the relevant improper-performance or forbearance conduct connected with undue advantage. Section 12 punishes abetment whether or not the abetted offence is ultimately committed, defeating statement 2. Section 15 can punish an attempt to commit the specified criminal-misconduct offence, so failure to complete misappropriation is not in itself an immunity.

The jewellery narrative needs a factual qualification: a mere unexecuted idea or preparatory plan is not automatically an attempt. An act sufficiently advancing the offence must be established. Because the printed scenario says the plan failed without clearly describing that act, this question is explained but excluded from automatic scoring.

Legal reference: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, ss.7, 12, 13(1)(a) and 15.
Prevention of Corruption Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Whether relevant senior officials of a private bank can be public servants for anti-corruption law

The judgment addressed the status of the relevant private-bank senior officials, including the chairperson/managing director, under the statutory public-servant framework. D identifies the issue.

The reasoning requires the interaction of the Prevention of Corruption Act with the Banking Regulation Act and the public functions involved. It should not be expanded into a statement that every private-sector employee is a public servant for every law. In a case-identification MCQ, match the institution and office in the facts to the statutory issue before considering unrelated corruption themes in the other options.

Legal reference: CBI v Ramesh Gelli, (2016) 3 SCC 788; Banking Regulation Act s.46A and relevant PCA provisions.
Prevention of Corruption Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — The statutory reporting exception is not secured by a social-media post

Section 8’s compelled-payment proviso requires the payer to report the matter to a law-enforcement authority or investigating agency within seven days. A social-media post is not, by itself, that statutory report. B is the best offered answer.

The distinction is between publicity and compliance with the reporting condition. Compulsion matters, but it does not remove the reporting requirement. Actual criminal liability still requires the statutory elements and procedural assessment; the answer should not be read as a final conviction based solely on a social-media narrative. For the exam, remember the recipient of the report and the seven-day time limit together.

Legal reference: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, s.8(1), proviso.
Prevention of Corruption Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — The firm may fall within the commercial-organisation bribery offence

Section 9’s definition of a commercial organisation includes a partnership formed outside India that carries on business, or part of a business, in India. An associated person’s bribery to obtain or retain business or a business advantage can therefore engage the firm’s liability, subject to the statutory requirements and defence. C is correct.

This does not mean the individual partner is immune. Individual liability under the relevant provision is a separate question. Nor is a completed cash transfer always necessary: promising an undue advantage may be sufficient for the applicable bribery offence. The geographical business connection, not just place of incorporation, is decisive.

Legal reference: Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, ss.8-9.
Prevention of Corruption Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — Mandatory use of the habitual-offender punishment provision for multiple bribes

B is the unrelated proposition. The judgment examines the evidentiary foundation for the corruption charge, particularly proof of demand and the significance of recovery, rather than laying down the suggested habitual-offender sentencing rule under section 14.

The Court’s conclusion turned on the failure to prove demand beyond reasonable doubt in the factual record. Recovery of tainted notes could not by itself cure that failure. A statutory presumption is engaged on proof of the necessary foundational facts; it is not a shortcut that automatically makes every recovery a proved bribe. The decision’s facts pre-date the later amended offence language, which should be kept separate when revising current law.

Legal reference: State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v C B Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736.
C B Nagaraj, 2025 INSC 736 — Supreme Court · Original UPSC paper

C — 1, 2 and 4 only

The listed Article 240 territories include Puducherry, Lakshadweep and Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu. Chandigarh is the excluded option for the constitutional text applicable to this paper. The correct combination is 1, 2 and 4.

Puducherry also has an important proviso concerning operation of its legislature and periods of dissolution or suspension. The provision should not be memorised as an unrestricted parallel lawmaking power at all times. Keep Article 239 administration, Article 239A/239AA legislative arrangements and Article 240 regulations as separate constitutional mechanisms.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.240.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — A matter finally decided on merits under Article 32 cannot ordinarily be reopened on the same cause under Article 226

B captures the relevant finality principle, provided the first adjudication was on the merits and the same matter is being reopened. A High Court cannot function as an appellate forum over a Supreme Court decision. The printed statement is abbreviated, so the merits and same-cause qualifications should be retained when learning the rule.

Article 143 extends to qualifying questions of law or fact, not merely constitutional interpretation. Article 226 is wider in subject matter than Article 32, because it also reaches other legal rights. An advisory opinion is not simply an executable decree between litigating parties; distinguish its constitutional authority and precedential relevance from ordinary binding adjudication.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.32, 143 and 226; finality/res judicata principles.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — Economically weaker sections under Article 16(6)

Article 16(6) expressly permits EWS reservation, subject to its terms, up to ten per cent of the posts in each category. It is the category with the stated numerical ceiling in the constitutional text asked for here.

The judicially developed reservation-ceiling doctrines and the constitutional provisions for other forms of reservation are separate matters. Do not answer this question by recalling a general percentage used in case law: the stem asks what Article 16 itself fixes. Always distinguish a textual constitutional number from a judicial rule and from a percentage prescribed in a particular government scheme.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.16(6).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 only

Only statement 1 is correct. Article 19(1)(e) is a citizens’ freedom. Article 19(5) permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public or for protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe, so statement 2 is too narrow.

Statement 3 is also too restrictive. The clause recognises operation of existing laws and permits laws imposing the specified reasonable restrictions; it does not confine the field to Parliament alone or to laws first enacted after commencement. Look for absolute words such as “only” in a constitutional statement—they often erase an express alternative in the text.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.19(1)(e) and (5).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — 1, 2 and 3

Article 66(3) contains all three requirements: citizenship of India, completion of thirty-five years and qualification for election as a member of the Council of States. D is correct. The disqualification concerning an office of profit must also be read with the constitutional exceptions.

The key comparison is with the President, whose parliamentary eligibility reference is the House of the People. That difference fits the Vice-President’s role as ex officio Chairman of the Council of States, but the constitutional qualification should still be learnt from the text rather than inferred solely from the office’s functions.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.66(3)-(4).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

C — 1 and 3 only

Statements 1 and 3 are correct. Article 358 addresses Article 19 in the specified emergency context, now limited by its text to an emergency based on war or external aggression. Article 359 excludes Articles 20 and 21 from the rights whose enforcement may be suspended by the presidential order contemplated there.

Statement 2 is therefore incorrect. Also distinguish suspension of a right’s enforcement under Article 359 from saying that the constitutional right has ceased to exist altogether. The articles use different mechanisms, with different conditions. “Emergency means all rights disappear” is an unsafe and legally inaccurate shortcut.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.358-359.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

C — No person anywhere in India may accept any foreign present, emolument or office in any circumstances

C is an overbroad statement. Article 18(4) concerns a person holding an office of profit or trust under the State, and contemplates the President’s consent for accepting a present, emolument or office of the stated kind from or under a foreign State. It is not an absolute prohibition on every person in India.

Article 18 also distinguishes titles from military or academic distinctions, and distinguishes the citizen rule from the rule for a non-citizen holding the specified office. Match the person, the benefit and the consent requirement separately; collapsing those categories produces the incorrect option.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.18.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — Living wage

Article 43 directs the State to endeavour to secure, by suitable means, work, a living wage and conditions ensuring a decent standard of life and enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities for workers. B is the constitutional phrase.

Minimum wage, fair wage and living wage are related but distinct concepts in labour-law study. This question asks the constitutional expression rather than the minimum statutory wage payable under a particular labour enactment. Because Article 43 is in Part IV, its nature and mode of implementation also differ from an individually enforceable fundamental right.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.43.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — The President nominates 12 members with the specified special knowledge or practical experience

Article 80 provides for twelve nominated members and not more than 238 representatives of the States and Union Territories. Thus 238 is not the total constitutional ceiling: the total maximum is 250. D is the correct statement.

The nominated fields are literature, science, art and social service. State representatives are elected by the elected members of the Legislative Assemblies through the prescribed proportional-representation system. Union Territory representation is dealt with in the manner Parliament prescribes, not simply by an Administrator choosing members. Distinguish the constitutional maximum from the actual filled strength at any particular time.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.80.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — Every life-imprisonment sentence regardless of subject matter

Article 72 covers court-martial cases, offences under laws relating to matters within Union executive power, and all death-sentence cases. “Every life sentence regardless of its subject matter” is not an additional free-standing category. B is the intended distinction.

This does not mean the President can never commute a life sentence. A life sentence may fall within an Article 72 category, including the Union-law category. The error is the word “all” without a jurisdictional connection. Read the question as testing the scope of the constitutional power, not merely the name of the punishment.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.72.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — Election Commissioner other than the Chief Election Commissioner

An Election Commissioner other than the Chief Election Commissioner is not removable except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. That differs from the judge-like parliamentary-address protection applying to the Supreme Court judge and, through the respective constitutional provisions, the High Court judge and CAG. D is correct.

Do not silently change “Election Commissioner” into “Chief Election Commissioner.” Article 324(5) deliberately distinguishes them. The question tests constitutional removal safeguards, not appointment mechanisms or day-to-day administrative control.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.124(4), 217, 218, 148(1) and 324(5).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 and 2

Article 329(a) concerns laws relating to delimitation of constituencies or allotment of seats to them, made or purporting to be made under the stated constitutional powers. Statements 1 and 2 fit that clause; electoral-roll preparation is not named as an additional category in it.

This is a question about the clause’s text, not a complete statement of every limit on judicial intervention in election matters. Article 329(b) and election-petition law address a different issue: how an election itself may be called in question. Keep the bar concerning delimitation laws separate from the election-dispute route.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.329(a)-(b).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — 1, 2 and 3

All three follow Article 107. Prorogation is not dissolution and does not cause the stated lapse. A Bill that is still only pending in Rajya Sabha and has not been passed by Lok Sabha survives dissolution of Lok Sabha. A Bill passed by Lok Sabha and pending in Rajya Sabha ordinarily lapses, subject to the constitutional joint-sitting exception.

Work from the Bill’s location and legislative history rather than memorising “all Bills lapse.” Ask whether Lok Sabha has passed it, where it is pending and whether the Article 108 situation has arisen.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.107(3)-(5) and 108.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — Charged-expenditure estimates cannot be discussed in Parliament

Article 113 draws a clear distinction: charged expenditure is not submitted to the vote of Parliament, but nothing in that clause prevents discussion of those estimates in either House. B incorrectly turns exemption from voting into a prohibition on discussion.

Other expenditure is submitted in the form of demands for grants to the House of the People, and a demand requires the President’s recommendation. In public-finance questions, separate discussion, voting, recommendation and appropriation. A constitutional safeguard concerning one step should not be transplanted to a different step.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.113.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

A — Lok Sabha passes an ordinary Bill and Rajya Sabha rejects it

Rejection by the other House is one of Article 108’s deadlock triggers for the qualifying Bill. The other triggers concern final disagreement over amendments and the specified period exceeding six months, calculated under the article—not merely three months. A is correct.

The mechanism does not extend to Money Bills, and constitutional amendment Bills follow Article 368’s separate requirements. It is also not a general device for combining the Houses whenever both must consider an important constitutional question, such as an emergency proclamation or removal address.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.108; compare Arts.109 and 368.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — A parliamentary agricultural-land acquisition law is necessarily void merely for conflict with equality

B wrongly states an automatic invalidity. Article 31A protects specified categories of laws, including qualifying acquisition-of-estate laws, against the stated fundamental-right challenges, subject to the provision’s conditions and provisos. It is not correct to say that the described acquisition law must necessarily be void for inconsistency with equality.

Article 300A supplies the authority-of-law protection for property; Article 265 does the same for taxation. Article 301 must be read with the other trade and commerce provisions. The answer should not be exaggerated into blanket immunity for every acquisition of any agricultural land: the precise statutory category and constitutional conditions still matter.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.31A, 265, 300A and 301-304.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — Delhi

The special constitutional provisions prescribe minimum Legislative Assembly sizes for Goa, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh: thirty, forty and thirty respectively. Article 239AA provides for Delhi’s Legislative Assembly but leaves its seat number to parliamentary law. B is correct.

Delhi’s statutory assembly strength should not be mistaken for a minimum number written into the Constitution itself. The question asks about the source of the rule. This is a useful recurring exam distinction: a familiar institutional number may come from the Constitution, an Act, rules or a later notification.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.239AA, 371G, 371H and 371I.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 and 2 only

Article 312 begins with a Council of States resolution supported by at least two-thirds of members present and voting, declaring it necessary or expedient in the national interest. Parliament may then provide by law for an All-India Service. Statements 1 and 2 fit that mechanism.

An All-India Judicial Service cannot include a post inferior to that of district judge as defined in Article 236. Statement 3 is therefore incorrect. Do not omit the Rajya Sabha resolution when revising the Parliament-by-law step: the article contains both a federal trigger and a legislative implementation stage.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.312, especially clauses (1) and (3).
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

C — It has absolute power over Assembly seat totals and territorial constituencies

Article 328 gives the State legislature a lawmaking role, but subject to the Constitution and insofar as Parliament has not made provision. The assertion of an absolute power in C is therefore incorrect. Seat numbers and constituencies are constrained by the constitutional scheme and applicable parliamentary legislation.

The word “all matters” in a power-conferring clause should always be read with its opening qualifications. A legislature may have a broad subject-matter competence without enjoying an unrestricted power to displace the Constitution or Parliament’s law in that field.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.327-328 and the relevant Assembly provisions.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

C — A pre-existing criminal proceeding may continue against a Governor during the term

Article 361(2) bars institution or continuation of criminal proceedings against the President or Governor in any court during the term of office. The fact that a proceeding began before appointment does not remove that temporary bar. C is incorrect.

The article also protects against court process for arrest or imprisonment during the term and addresses official-function answerability. The impeachment-related proviso concerns investigation of the President’s conduct under Article 61. Keep temporary personal procedural immunity separate from a claim that the underlying conduct can never be examined or that the office-holder is above the law.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.361.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

D — A substantially true protected report without malice, excluding secret sittings, within the article’s publication/broadcast framework

D is the most complete option. Article 361A protects the qualifying publication of a substantially true report, with the stated malice exception, and excludes secret sittings. Its broadcast extension must also be read according to the article’s terms.

The other alternatives omit essential qualifications or turn a defined protection into an unlimited one. “True” alone is not a complete substitute for reading the protected medium, nature of the report and express exclusions. The purpose of the MCQ is to recognise the whole constitutional protection, not merely its most memorable phrase.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.361A.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

C — 3 only

Only statement 3 is correct. Article 68 requires the election for a regular expiry vacancy to be completed before the term ends. A casual vacancy is filled as soon as possible; the Constitution does not prescribe the two-month period asserted in statement 1.

Under Article 66(2), a member of Parliament or a State legislature elected as Vice-President is deemed to vacate that seat on entering the Vice-President’s office, not on election day. The distinction between election, assumption of office and expiry of a term is the central timing trap.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.66(2) and 68.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — 2 only (preferred; see review note)

On a strict reading, B is preferable: statement 2 follows Article 73(1)(b), while statement 1 states the concurrent-field exclusion too absolutely. The proviso to Article 73(1)(a) preserves situations expressly provided by the Constitution or a law made by Parliament; Union executive power can therefore extend into the overlapping field in those circumstances.

C can appear plausible if statement 1 is treated merely as shorthand for the default rule and the opening qualification is read very broadly. That interpretive ambiguity is precisely why this item is excluded from the automatic score. The learning point is definite: the proviso’s exception must not be omitted from a revision note.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Art.73(1) and its proviso.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — An Election Commissioner’s removal route differs from a UPSC member’s

B is correct. The removal arrangement for an Election Commissioner under Article 324(5) differs from the Article 317 framework for a UPSC member. Article 317 also expressly addresses suspension in its specified circumstances; the Constitution does not supply an equivalent express suspension provision for an Election Commissioner.

Maharashtra is covered by Article 371’s special provisions. The status of Article 370 following the 2019 constitutional measures should not be described by casually saying its text was repealed. This question rewards precise constitutional terminology and careful comparison of institutions whose names and safeguards are easily conflated.

Legal reference: Constitution of India, Arts.317, 324(5), 370 and 371.
Constitution of India — Legislative Department · Original UPSC paper

B — DSPE may investigate every kind of offence without the notification requirement

Section 3 allows the Central Government to specify by notification the offences or classes of offences to be investigated by DSPE. Thus its statutory competence is not accurately described as an unqualified power over every kind of offence. B is incorrect.

Section 2 governs the establishment and relevant police powers in Union Territories, including the rank condition for exercising the specified powers of an officer in charge of a police station. Extension into States raises further issues under sections 5 and 6. Keep subject-matter notification, territorial extension and the officer’s rank as three different questions.

Legal reference: Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, ss.2-3 and 5-6.
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 and 2 only

Section 4 separates superintendence according to subject matter. The CVC has the statutory role for investigations of offences alleged under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Save for that field, superintendence vests in the Central Government. Statements 1 and 2 are correct.

The Administrator proposition is not the allocation made by this section. Also distinguish superintendence from administration: the latter vests in the Director under section 4(3). Many questions in this cluster repeat the same institutional names but switch the function, so attach the exact verb to the correct authority.

Legal reference: Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, s.4(1)-(3).
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — Both 1 and 2

Both propositions follow section 4(3). Administration vests in the Director, who exercises the powers identified there on the statutory terms. C is correct.

This should be read alongside the previous question: administration by the Director does not erase the distinct arrangements for superintendence by the CVC and Central Government. Administrative control, investigative decisions, appointment, tenure and superintendence are related but separate legal concepts. A compact institution-function table is especially useful for this part of the paper.

Legal reference: Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, s.4(3).
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — The initial tenure may be extended through the prescribed process

Section 4B permits extensions in public interest on the prescribed committee’s recommendation and for recorded reasons, up to one year at a time, subject to a total five-year limit including the initial appointment period. C is correct; the six-year assertion is wrong.

The appointment committee under section 4A also includes the specified opposition representative in Lok Sabha, so A is incomplete. Transfer is governed by the statutory committee-consent requirement, not by a free-standing recommendation of the Chief Justice alone. Learn appointment, extension and transfer as three separate procedural questions.

Legal reference: Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, ss.4A-4B, as amended in 2021.
DSPE 2021 tenure amendment — official Gazette text · Original UPSC paper

C — Both 1 and 2

Both fall within the express explanation to section 5. The direction power includes closure, prohibition or regulation of an industry, operation or process, and stoppage or regulation of electricity, water or another service. C is correct.

The power is exercised within the statute and applicable procedure; the inclusion of essential-service directions is not a claim that any official may disconnect any supply informally. The examination point is that section 5 is not confined to issuing advisory pollution-control instructions: it includes concrete preventive and regulatory directions.

Legal reference: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, s.5 and its explanation.
Environment Act, amended text — India Code · Original UPSC paper

Review: no definitive single option asserted

Under the older section 15, statements 1 and 2 described parts of the penalty framework, while the continuing-offence imprisonment ceiling was seven years, not ten. On that historical text, C is the intended combination.

However, the Jan Vishwas amendments substituted the relevant provisions with effect from 1 April 2024. The amended general residual section 15 provides a monetary penalty of ₹10,000 to ₹15 lakh and an additional ₹10,000 per day for continuing contravention; other provisions address specified contraventions, companies and non-payment. The old options therefore do not offer a valid current-law combination for a January 2026 paper. This is an amendment-review item, not a claim that UPSC officially deleted it.

Legal reference: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, amended ss.14A-15F; Jan Vishwas Act, 2023, effective 1 April 2024.
Environment Act, amended text — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Section 19 recognises a complaint by the Central Government or an authority/officer authorised on its behalf. The private-person route uses notice of not less than sixty days, in the prescribed manner, rather than thirty. Only statement 1 is correct.

A notice requirement is not the same as a time limit for the Government to decide a complaint. It is a statutory precondition to the particular private-complaint route. The amended Act also distinguishes civil-penalty adjudication from prosecution for the offences that remain; do not assume every contravention proceeds through the same criminal-complaint mechanism.

Legal reference: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, s.19.
Environment Act, amended text — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — Environmental pollution is defined only by substances injurious to human beings

B both narrows the protected subject and blurs the definitions. An environmental pollutant is a solid, liquid or gaseous substance present in a concentration that may be, or tend to be, injurious to the environment. Environmental pollution is the presence of an environmental pollutant in the environment. Protection is not confined to injury to humans.

The hazardous-substance definition is also wider than human harm. When two adjacent definitions share several words, identify their relationship: pollutant is the substance at the relevant concentration; pollution is its presence in the environment. That distinction defeats the misleading option.

Legal reference: Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, s.2(b)-(e); relevant company definition.
Environment Act, amended text — India Code · Original UPSC paper

D — Neither 1 nor 2

Both assertions are wrong. BSA section 132 protects the qualifying professional communication about defending a past offence, subject to the section’s terms. Legal representation of a person accused of forgery is not itself an illegal purpose.

The second request is different: it seeks the advocate’s assistance to advance an illegal purpose using a forged document, which falls outside the protection. The important distinction is not whether the client is morally blameworthy; it is whether the communication concerns legitimate professional assistance or is made in furtherance of an illegal purpose. Privilege and its exceptions must be applied to the purpose of the communication.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.132.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Statement 1 follows the statutory illustration. Statement 2 wrongly discards the fact connecting the particular letter to the ordinary course of dispatch. Both the usual business practice and the placement of that letter in the relevant location can help infer dispatch.

Relevance does not mean conclusive proof. The other party may rebut the inference with evidence showing that the usual course was not followed or the letter did not arrive. Think of the reasoning as a chain: ordinary practice plus a fact linking this transaction to that practice, not a bare habit divorced from the disputed transaction.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.14 and illustrations.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — It is enough to establish a state of mind generally, without linking it to the matter in issue

The explanation requires the relevant state of mind to exist in reference to the particular matter in question, not merely generally. A reverses that limitation. A general assertion that someone is aggressive or dishonest is not automatically proof of the specific intention alleged.

The illustrations and explanation permit particular connected facts, such as previous conduct towards the same victim, where they bear on the relevant intention. Always distinguish a fact showing a material state of mind from an attempt to prove guilt merely through a general bad-character narrative.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.12, explanations and illustrations.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

D — A relationship statement based on special knowledge is relevant regardless of whether it was made before or after the dispute arose

D omits the important pre-dispute condition for the relationship category. The relevant statement must satisfy the statutory conditions, including that it was made before the question in dispute was raised. The provision does not admit every relationship assertion simply because its maker later died.

BSA section 26 contains several distinct categories of relevant statements by persons who cannot be called in the specified circumstances. Ordinary-course business statements, public-right statements and relationship statements have different elements. Death alone is not a general licence to admit all hearsay: identify the precise category and its conditions.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.26, particularly clauses concerning business, public rights and relationship.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

C — 1 and 3 only

BSA section 11 makes relevant transactions and particular instances by which the disputed right or custom was created, claimed, modified, recognised, asserted or denied. The mortgage and exercise of the right in the pond concerned fit that framework. Statements 1 and 3 are correct.

Rights over unrelated ponds do not, without an additional connecting fact, prove the particular right in dispute. Do not infer one legal entitlement solely from another similar entitlement elsewhere. Relevance depends on the connection to the right or custom that the court is actually being asked to determine.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.11 and its illustration.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — Conviction on a complete chain of circumstantial evidence

The Supreme Court examined a conviction resting on circumstantial evidence, including the last-seen circumstance, recoveries, forensic material and alleged abscondence. A identifies the subject. The official judgment is reported as 2025 INSC 793.

For revision, connect the case to the requirement that incriminating circumstances be proved and collectively support the legally required conclusion. A series of suspicions does not become a proved chain merely through accumulation. This question asks the judgment’s principal issue, so it should not be answered from a random evidence-law phrase appearing among the distractors.

Legal reference: Chetan v State of Karnataka, 2025 INSC 793, 30 May 2025.
Chetan, 2025 INSC 793 — Supreme Court · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 and 3

Persons 1 and 3 have the stated business-related exposure to the handwriting. Physical acquaintance with the writer is not indispensable: the statute recognises acquisition of familiarity through the ordinary course of business and correspondence. A is correct.

The gatekeeper’s daily personal contact alone does not establish familiarity with handwriting. That person might qualify on additional facts, such as repeatedly seeing X write, but those facts are not supplied. The question tests the source of the witness’s knowledge, not how often the witness sees the writer’s face.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.41 and explanation.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

B — Leading questions are prohibited in cross-examination

Leading questions may be asked in cross-examination. B therefore reverses the statutory rule. Restrictions on leading questions in examination-in-chief or re-examination are not the same as the cross-examination rule, and the court retains control of fairness and relevance.

The other choices reflect aspects of the court’s control over questioning. A question’s subject matter, necessity and form all matter. Cross-examination is a testing process, but that does not make insulting, needlessly offensive or legally impermissible questions acceptable. Learn permission to lead and judicial control of abusive questioning together.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.146 and the provisions controlling improper questions.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Only statement 1 is correct. A dying declaration that meets the legal requirements and is found reliable can be the sole basis for conviction; corroboration is not an invariable legal precondition. Reliability still requires careful judicial scrutiny.

Documentary contents may be proved by primary evidence or by secondary evidence where the law permits it. An oral account of a document’s contents by someone who has seen it is a category of secondary evidence, not primary evidence. Admissibility conditions for using secondary evidence remain essential; listing a form of secondary evidence does not automatically make it usable in every case.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, ss.26 and 56-60; dying-declaration principles.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

B — 2 only

B is correct. The referred-person rule treats a statement by a person expressly referred to for information about the disputed matter as an admission in the statutory circumstances. That defeats statement 1.

The rent example concerns a person whose position or liability is necessary to prove against a party to the suit, and follows the relevant statutory illustration. Do not assume that only a named litigant can ever make a relevant admission. The Act specifies additional categories, each with its own relationship to the issue and conditions for using the statement.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, ss.17-18 and illustrations.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Statement 1 is correct. The Act makes previous good character relevant in criminal proceedings. Statement 2 states the opposite of the document-production rule: a party who refused production after the requisite notice cannot subsequently use the document as evidence without the other party’s consent or the court’s order.

The latter rule prevents a party from withholding a document when the opponent calls for it and then deploying it later as a surprise. Character evidence and document-production sanctions belong to different chapters, so solve the two statements independently before selecting the combination.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, s.47 and the provision on using a document earlier refused on notice.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Statement 1 reflects the special ownership-burden rule. Statement 2 is incorrect: the Act places the burden of establishing circumstances bringing the case within a General Exception on the accused, with the court presuming absence of those circumstances under the relevant provision.

This special burden does not erase the prosecution’s duty to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The standards and interaction of the burdens matter: defence material may also create a reasonable doubt about an offence ingredient. Avoid the two extremes of saying the prosecution must prove every exception or saying the accused must disprove the entire criminal case.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, ss.108 and 113.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

C — A-2, B-3, C-4, D-1

The sequence is 2-3-4-1. Examination-in-chief is by the party calling the witness; cross-examination is by the adverse party; re-examination is subsequent questioning by the party who called the witness. A leading question suggests the answer desired or expected by the questioner.

These concepts are different dimensions: chief/cross/re-examination identify the stage and questioner, whereas leading describes a question’s form. A question can therefore be both a cross-examination question and a leading question. That is why the previous item’s claim that leading questions cannot be asked in cross-examination is wrong.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, definitions of examinations and leading questions.
BSA — official India Code text · Original UPSC paper

B — 2 only

BNS section 5 permits the appropriate Government’s statutory commutation without the offender’s consent. Statement 1 is therefore wrong. Section 12 limits a continuous spell of solitary confinement to fourteen days, with required intervals; further restrictions apply in the circumstances stated there. Statement 2 is correct.

Do not confuse the maximum length of one spell with the overall solitary-confinement limits under the preceding section or the additional monthly restriction for longer imprisonment. Likewise, commutation changes the punishment through lawful authority; it is not a bargain that necessarily requires the prisoner’s agreement.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss.5 and 11-12.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — BNS section 19

Section 19 addresses an act likely to cause harm, done without criminal intent and in good faith to prevent or avoid other harm. The ship example illustrates that necessity-based defence. D is the correct provision.

The issue is not simply that the resulting harm was accidental. The captain deliberately chooses a course carrying a risk of harm in order to avert the greater threatened harm. Good faith, absence of criminal intention and the nature and imminence of the danger remain factual requirements; the defence does not authorise any harmful act merely because its maker later calls it the lesser evil.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.19 and illustration.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — Criminal breach of trust

The initial possession is based on entrustment. Y then dishonestly disposes of the property contrary to that trust. Those facts point to criminal breach of trust under section 316. B is correct.

Theft generally focuses on dishonest moving of movable property out of another’s possession without consent. Here the key fact is lawful receipt followed by dishonest misuse. Robbery and snatching require different additional circumstances absent from the narrative. In property-offence questions, first identify how possession was obtained; that often separates theft, misappropriation and breach of trust.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.316.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — Khushboo Saifi v Union of India (2022)

Khushboo Saifi was among the connected Delhi High Court proceedings concerning the marital rape exception, decided through the 2022 split opinions. A identifies the relevant litigation. The better-known connected case title is RIT Foundation v Union of India.

Do not turn this identification answer into a statement that a single unanimous 2022 judgment abolished the exception. Joseph Shine concerns adultery; Indian Young Lawyers Association concerns Sabarimala; and Naz Foundation concerns the section 377 challenge. The question asks which litigation addressed this issue, not the final present-day status of every subsequent proceeding.

Legal reference: Khushboo Saifi / connected RIT Foundation proceedings, Delhi High Court, 2022.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — 2 and 3 only

Statements 2 and 3 are incorrect. A thing attached to the earth becomes capable of being the subject of theft when severed; the same act may effect severance and moving where the required dishonest intention exists. Dacoity requires five or more persons conjointly committing or attempting robbery, including the persons counted under the provision.

Statement 1 reflects the robbery rule when the fear is caused for the statutory purpose in committing the theft, carrying away or attempting to carry away the property. Not every threat near a theft automatically makes it robbery; the required connection and immediacy matter.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss.303, 309 and 310.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — Snatching

Section 304 separately defines snatching in the BNS. The other listed offence categories already appeared in the IPC framework. C is correct.

This does not mean the underlying act of forcibly taking property was always lawful before the BNS. Depending on its facts, earlier conduct could attract theft, robbery or other provisions. The change tested is the creation of a distinct statutory offence and definition called snatching, not the invention of criminal liability for all such conduct from scratch.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.304.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — 1 only

Only statement 1 is correct. Mithu invalidated the mandatory death-punishment provision in IPC section 303. BNS section 104 provides death or imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life; it does not make death the only permissible sentence.

Gian Kaur concerned a different constitutional question relating to suicide and the right to life; it did not overrule Mithu in the manner asserted. The recurring trap is omission of “or” from a punishment provision. Read alternatives and mandatory minimums exactly rather than treating every reference to death punishment as mandatory death.

Legal reference: Mithu v State of Punjab (1983); Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996); BNS s.104.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — A can be guilty of abetting murder

Instigation can constitute abetment even though the act instigated is not ultimately committed. The abetted person’s capacity and the failure to complete the principal act do not automatically erase the abettor’s liability. A is the best answer under the stated facts.

Criminal conspiracy requires the relevant agreement. A unilateral instruction to the child, without the necessary further facts, does not justify automatically adding conspiracy. Also keep abetment separate from conviction for the completed murder: no death or poisoning is supplied in this narrative. The question concerns the completed instigation and the statutory abetment rules.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss.45-46 and the explanations on abetment.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

A’s instigation covers burning the house. The additional independent theft is not automatically included merely because B commits it at the same location and time. A is the correct option on the facts supplied.

The BNS does address liability where a different act or consequence is a probable result of the abetment and the statutory conditions are satisfied. But that is a legal test, not a rule that the abettor answers for every additional offence the principal independently chooses to commit. Identify the scope of instigation and the connection of the extra act to it.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss.45 and 51-52.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — 1, 2 and 3

All three are correct with their legal qualifications. The deceased-person explanation requires the specified imputation and intention to hurt the feelings of the deceased’s family or other near relatives. The truth exception also requires public good; truth alone is not the full criminal-defamation exception.

Subramanian Swamy v Union of India upheld the challenged criminal-defamation provisions in 2016. When answering combination questions, preserve the conditions embedded in the definition and exceptions. A broad mnemonic such as “truth always defeats defamation” would teach a materially incomplete rule.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.356, explanation 1 and exception 1; Subramanian Swamy (2016).
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Statement 1 reflects section 44’s narrow situation: an assault reasonably causing apprehension of death where the defender cannot effectively exercise the right without risk to an innocent person. It is not a general permission to harm bystanders in any confrontation.

Statement 2 is false because the right can protect another person’s body as well as one’s own. Statement 3 is false because the enumerated section 38 situations include an assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting, subject to the right’s governing limits. Only statement 1 is correct on the intended statutory reading.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, ss.35, 38 and 44.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

D — 1, 2, 3 and 4

All four are covered by section 116’s enumerated categories. The provision includes emasculation, permanent disfigurement of the head or face, and fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. D is correct.

The tooth option is a common trap: a tooth need not be treated as outside the provision merely because the option is not a limb fracture. At the same time, not every injury is grievous hurt simply because it is painful or looks serious. Classification must be tied to one of the listed statutory categories and proved on the evidence.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.116.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

C — 2 and 3

Statements 2 and 3 are the theft examples. Ownership is not the sole issue: taking one’s own property from another’s lawful possession can be theft where dishonest intention and the other ingredients exist, as in defeating the repairer’s lawful security for payment. A tree becomes movable on severance, and the severing act can also move it for theft.

The unpossessed-ring example lacks taking out of another’s possession, although later dishonest conduct may raise a different offence. The good-faith book example lacks dishonest intention. Non-payment alone should not be treated as theft without the required possession, lien and dishonest-taking facts.

Legal reference: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s.303, explanations and illustrations.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal

Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, decided in 2014, is the obscenity case among these alternatives. B is correct. It is commonly studied for the contemporary community-standards approach and the need to evaluate the material in its context.

Nudity in isolation is not an automatic substitute for the legal obscenity test. For case-law revision, pair the case with the relevant issue and analytical approach, then check the statutory ingredients separately. Do not carry an old-law section number into a BNS answer without mapping the provision.

Legal reference: Aveek Sarkar v State of West Bengal, (2014) 4 SCC 257; relevant BNS obscenity provisions.
BNS — official India Code record · Original UPSC paper

B — Not more than two Vigilance Commissioners

Section 3(2) provides for the Central Vigilance Commissioner as Chairperson and not more than two Vigilance Commissioners as members. B is correct. The maximum body size under that composition is therefore three, including the Central Vigilance Commissioner.

The distractor works by taking that total and mistakenly making it the number of additional commissioners. Be precise about whether a number includes the chairperson. Also distinguish a statutory maximum composition from the number of posts currently filled; the question asks the Act’s rule, not current vacancies.

Legal reference: Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, s.3(2).
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

A — 1 only

Section 11 confers specified civil-court powers for the inquiries covered by the provision, including summoning, production and the other listed matters. Statement 1 is correct in that scope; it does not make the Commission a general civil trial court for every dispute.

Section 11A prescribes a Director of Inquiry not below the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India, appointed by the Central Government for the stated Lokpal-referred preliminary inquiries. A bare ten-year service requirement is not the statutory qualification. Statement 2 is therefore incorrect.

Legal reference: Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, ss.11 and 11A.
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

B — 1, 2 and 4 only

Section 4 specifies the Prime Minister as chairperson, the Union Home Minister and the Leader of Opposition in the House of the People. The provision’s explanation deals with the relevant opposition-leader situation. The Chief Justice or a nominated Supreme Court judge is not part of this committee. B is correct.

Do not import the DSPE Director’s appointment-committee composition into the CVC appointment rule. Both contain the Prime Minister and an opposition component, but the third institutional member differs. These adjacent questions deliberately reward a separate committee table for each office.

Legal reference: Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, s.4(1) and explanation.
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper

C — Both 1 and 2

Both propositions fall within the Commission’s statutory functions under section 8, subject to the jurisdictional categories and conditions. The complaint-inquiry power and the superintendence role are related but distinct parts of the framework. C is correct.

Superintendence should not be read as permission to dictate that a particular case must be investigated or disposed of in a particular manner contrary to the statutory limitation. Similarly, the complaint power is exercised within the Act’s defined public-servant jurisdiction. Conclude this paper by linking the CVC Act with the DSPE Act’s allocation of superintendence and administration.

Legal reference: Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, s.8; DSPE Act s.4.
Central Vigilance Commission Act — India Code · Original UPSC paper